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 Questions of the existence of an employment relationship are not 
easily resolved by only turning to federal labor and employment 
statutes. Federal employment laws provide definitions for “employer” 
and “employee,” but the definitions are not always helpful and often 
do not provide enough guidance when the employment relationship is 
in dispute. It is crucial that labor and employment laws clearly define 
who is protected and who is not. The question of who is considered an 
employee and who is considered an employer is equally important to 
both parties. Employees need to know whether they are protected 
under the law, and employers need to know whether they are subject 
to liability.1 Vague definitions in the statutes and application of ever-
                                                 
  J.D. candidate, May 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, B.S. in Psychology, minor 
in Political Science, May 2017. 
 1 Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An 
Analysis of Employees and Employers Who Operate in the Borderland between an 
Employer-and-Employee Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 609 (2012). 
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changing tests, with the goal of defining an employment relationship, 
are evidence of inconsistency in the law.  
 The Seventh Circuit recently explored this topic in Harris v. Allen 
County Board of Commissioners.2 The plaintiff, Harris, was employed 
by the Allen County Superior Court as a Youth Care Specialist but 
was stationed at the Allen County Juvenile Center.3 The plaintiff 
signed the Allen Superior Court’s employee handbook, acknowledging 
the Superior Court as his employer. However, other documents that 
the plaintiff received during the term of his employment, such as his 
medical records authorization and performance evaluations, bore the 
seal of the Allen County Board of Commissioners, or listed the board 
as the plaintiff’s employer.4 The plaintiff was injured while at the 
Juvenile Center, collected workers’ compensation benefits and later 
tried to return to work, but was denied his position because of physical 
restrictions caused by his injury.5 The plaintiff filed a discrimination 
suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against both the 
Allen County Superior Court and the Allen County Board of 
Commissioners.6 The question at issue was whether the Board of 
Commissioners was an indirect employer of the plaintiff and the court 
determined it was not based on an analysis of “sufficient control.”7  
 Part I of this note explores current labor and employment statutes 
and the statutory language courts turn to when beginning their analysis 
as to whether an employment relationship exists between an individual 
and an employer. Part II discuss the various tests used to establish the 
employment relationship and how the Seventh Circuit’s test has 
evolved over the years. Part III provides an overview of the Seventh 
Circuit’s opinion in Harris v. Allen County Board of Commissioners. 
Part IV then discusses whether the Seventh Circuit correctly decided 
the case. Part V provides a broad discussion about the concerns with 
                                                 
 2 890 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 3 Id. at 681.  
 4 Id. at 681-82. 
 5 Id. at 682.  
 6 Id. at 683. 
 7 Id.  
2
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inconsistency in the courts and how mislabeling employees as 
independent contractors has detrimental effects on both employers and 
employees. Finally, the note concludes with a suggestion as to how the 




A. Examples of Statutory Definitions 
 
 To begin the discussion about employment status, one would 
think it would be most helpful to turn to the actual language of the 
statute under which the employer or employee is seeking relief.  
 Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), an 
“employee” is defined as “an individual employed by an employer.”8 
An “employer” is defined as “a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce that has 15 or more employees for each working 
day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding 
calendar year.”9 Similar anti-discrimination laws define the terms 
almost identically.10  
                                                 
 8 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(4). 
 9 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(A). 
 10 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) defines “employee” as 
“an individual employed by any employer except that the term ‘employee’ shall not 
include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of 
any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be 
on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level or an 
immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers 
of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include 
employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental 
agency, or political subdivision. The term “employee” includes any individual who 
is a citizen of the United States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign 
country.” 29 USCS § 630(f). “Employer” under the ADEA “means a person engaged 
in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each 
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding 
calendar year: Provided, That prior to June 30, 1968, employers having fewer than 
fifty employees shall not be considered employers. The term also means (1) any 
agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State and any 
agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State, and any 
3
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 The Supreme Court previously “recognized that it is appropriate 
for a court construing one employment statute . . . to look to other 
employment law statutes . . . for guidance.”11 Consider the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
below.  
 The FLSA defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an 
employer”12 and “employer” as 
 
                                                                                                                   
interstate agency, but such term does not include the United States, or a corporation 
wholly owned by the Government of the United States.” 29 USCS § 630(b). Title 
VII defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer, except that the 
term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or 
political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person 
chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the 
policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the 
constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding 
sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State 
government, governmental agency or political subdivision. With respect to 
employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen 
of the United States.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(f). “Employer” is “a person engaged in 
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working 
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar 
year, and any agent of such a person, but such term does not include (1) the United 
States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an 
Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by 
statute to procedures of the competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of Title 
5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization) 
which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of Title 26, except that during 
the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer than twenty-five 
employees (and their agents) shall not be considered employers.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000e(b). 
 11 Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An 
Analysis of Employees and Employers Who Operate in the Borderland between an 
Employer-and-Employee Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 611 (2012). See, 
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 723 (1947) (In an FLSA case, it 
was appropriate to turn to the NLRA for guidance because these acts are both 
considered to be part of “social legislation.”). 
 12 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(e)(1). Exceptions outlined in (2)-(4). 
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any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an 
employer in relation to an employee and includes a public 
agency but does not include any labor organization (other 
than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting in the 
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.”13  
 
The NLRA defines “employee” as 
 
Any person any person acting as an agent of an employer, 
directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States 
or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any 
Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision 
thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as 
amended from time to time, or any labor organization (other 
than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the 
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.14  
 
“Employer” is defined as 
 
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or 
indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any 
wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal 
Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or 
any person subject to the Railway Labor Act as amended 
from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when 
acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of 
officer or agent of such labor organization.”15  
 
 While some statutes are more detailed than others, it remains 
clear that the language is quite circular- leaving the courts to have 
to develop their own tests to establish whether an employment 
relationship exists. 
                                                 
 13 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(d). 
 14 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3). 
 15 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(2).  
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B. The Standards Used to Establish an Employment 
Relationship are Plentiful (to say the least) 
 
 The Supreme Court has said that the common law agency test is 
the appropriate standard to apply when the statute does not provide a 
clear-cut definition.16 Under agency law, the employer (master) is a 
“principal who employs an agent . . . to perform service in his affairs 
and who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the 
other in the performance of that service.”17 The employee (servant) is 
“an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs 
whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled 
or is subject to the control by the master.”18 This begins the discussion 
of the numerous standards created by the courts to determine 
employment status.  
 The Court in Darden adopted this common-law test to define 
“employee” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA).19 The Court considered  
 
the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by 
which the product is accomplished . . . the skill required; the 
source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the 
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; 
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional 
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s 
discretion over when and how long the work; the method of 
payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying 
assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of 
the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the 
                                                 
 16 Emily Bodtke, When Volunteers Become Employees: Using a 
Threshold-Remuneration Test Informed by the Fair Labor Standards Act to 
Distinguish Employees from Volunteers, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1113 (2015) (citing 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992)).  
17 Restatement of Agency (Second) 220(1) (1958). 
18 Restatement of Agency (Second) 220(2) (1958). 
19 Darden, 503 U.S. at 323. 
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provision of the employee benefits; and the tax treatment of 
the hired party.20 
 
 Additionally, the Court noted that this common-law test calls for 
“all of the incidents of the relationship [to] be assessed and weighed 
with no one factor being decisive.”21 
 In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court again was asked to 
determine whether an individual was an employee under the ADA.22 
The individuals in that case were four physician-shareholders who 
owned the corporation,23 and they constituted the board of directors 
for the corporation.24 The Court, again looking at the relationship 
through an agency lens, determined that the element of control was 
“the principal guidepost that should be followed in this case.”25 The 
case turned on whether the shareholder-directors worked 
independently or whether they were under the control of the 
clinic.26This analysis was also guided by a test created by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that used 6-factors to 
answer the Court’s very question.27 The factors consider 
 
(1)whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or 
set the rules and regulations of the individual’s work; (2) 
whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises 
the individual’s work; (3) whether the individual reports to 
                                                 
 20 Id. (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 
(1989)).  
 21 Id. at 324 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 258 
(1968)). (“Since the common-law test contains ‘no shorthand formula or magic 
phrase that be applied to find the answer . . . .’”) 
 22 Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 441-42 
(2003).  
 23 A medical clinic. 
 24 Id. at 442.  
 25 Id. at 448. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 449 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Compliance 
Manual §§ 605:0008-605:00010 (2000)). 
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someone higher in the organization; (4) whether and, if so, to 
what extent the individual is able to influence the 
organization; (5) whether the parties intended that the 
individual be an employee, as expressed in written 
agreements or contracts; and (6) whether the individual 
shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the 
organization.28  
 
Interestingly, the Court returned to its own language from Darden 
when it said that there is no “shorthand formula or magic phrase” by 
which an answer can be found in every case.29 This language seems to 
suggest that no one factor is determinative and all the circumstances 
surrounding each case should be considered.  
 States, such as California, have also developed their own 
standards when dealing with questions of employment status. The 
California Supreme Court in Dynamex created a new test for 
determining whether an individual is an employee or and independent 
contractor.30 After a lengthy discussion about previous California 
cases that dealt with this same question, the California Supreme Court 
concluded that it would apply a 3-factor test, also known as the 
“ABC” test.31 This test asks employers, when classifying individuals 
as independent contractors, to establish that  
 
(A) the worker is free from the control and direction of the 
hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work, 
both under the contract for the performance of the work and 
in fact; and (B) that the worker performs work that is outside 
the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) that 
                                                 
 28 EEOC Compliance Manual § 605:0009. 
 29 Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450 n.10.  
30 Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018). 
This case addressed wage-hour issues, in comparison to other cases cited in this note 
that primarily fall under labor and employment statutes, but it is helpful to see how 
the standards in various courts can be so different. 
31 Id. at 955. Under this standard, workers are automatically considered 
employees unless the employer can satisfy the test. 
8
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the worker is customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature 
as the work performed.32   
 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) also created its own standard 
for employers to use when determining whether an individual is an 
employee or an independent contractor for tax purposes.33 One scholar 
suggested a rise in the use of independent contractors by businesses in 
order to “cut costs while maintaining a high level of operational 
efficiency.”34 This inevitably leads to blurred lines and the IRS 
developed a 20-factor test35 by looking at “past cases and rulings 
bearing on the determination of whether a business’s purported 
independent contractors were actually employees.”36 
 The Seventh Circuit, like many other circuits, applies a multi-
factor test to address the question of employment status. In Knight v. 
United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, the Northern 
District of Indiana addressed the “economic realities” test as one that 
most courts use to “determin[e] whether a Title VII claimant is an 
employee or an independent contractor.”37 The district court turned to 
a D.C. Circuit case38, among others,39 which looked to the “economic 
realities” of the work relationship between the employee and the 
                                                 
 32 Id. at 957.  
33 Rev. Rul. 87-41 (IRS RRU), 1987-1 C.B. 296, 1987 WL 419174 
34 Alexandre Zucco, Independent Contractors and the Internal Revenue 
Service’s “Twenty Factor” Test: Perspective on the Problems of Today and the 
Solutions for Tomorrow, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 599 (2011). 
35 Rev. Rul. 87-41 (IRS RRU), 1987-1 C.B. 296, 1987 WL 419174 
36 Alexandre Zucco, Independent Contractors and the Internal Revenue 
Service’s “Twenty Factor” Test: Perspective on the Problems of Today and the 
Solutions for Tomorrow, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 601 (2011). 
37 742 F. Supp. 518, 521 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (citing Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 
F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
38 Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831. 
39 See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1987); Mares v. Marsh, 
777 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1985); Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979 (4th 
Cir.1983); Cobb v. Sun Papers, 673 F.2d 337 (11th Cir.). 
9
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employer.40 The D.C. Circuit considered the general principles of the 
law of “agency” and identified eleven factors which were pertinent in 
deciding whether an employment relationship existed between the 
parties.41 The factors included:  
 
(1) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether the 
work usually is done under the direction of a supervisor or is 
done by a specialist without supervision; (2) the skill required 
in the particular occupation; (3) whether the “employer” or 
the individual in question furnishes the equipment used and 
the place of work; (4) the length of time during which the 
individual has worked; (5) the method of payment, whether 
by time or by the job; (6) the manner in which the work 
relationship is terminated; I. e., by one or both parties, with or 
without notice and explanation; (7) whether annual leave is 
afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the 
business of the “employer”; (9) whether the worker 
accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the “employer” 
pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention of the 
parties.42 
 
 The district court in Knight, without much of an explanation, 
consolidated the D.C. Circuit’s eleven-factor test into five factors.43 
This test became known as the Knight five-factor test. Its factors 
included:  
 
(1) the extent of the employer's control and supervision over 
the worker, including directions on scheduling and 
performance of work; (2) the kind of occupation and nature 
of skill required, including whether skills are obtained in the 
workplace; (3) responsibility for the costs of operation, such 
                                                 
40 Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831. 
 41 Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831-32.  
42 Id. at 832. 
43 742 F. Supp. at 521. 
10
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as equipment, supplies, fees, licenses, workplace, and 
maintenance of operations; (4) method and form of payment 
and benefits; and (5) length of job commitment and/or 
expectations.44 
 
 The plaintiff appealed the case to the Seventh Circuit, which 
validated the use of the five-factor test. 45 Today, the Seventh Circuit 
still applies the five-factor test when trying to determine whether an 
employment relationship exists.46 
 
HOW THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT MOST RECENTLY APPLIED THE KNIGHT FIVE-
FACTOR TEST  
 
 In Harris v. Allen County Board of Commissioners, the plaintiff, 
Harris, was employed by the Allen County Superior Court (Superior 
Court) to work in a juvenile center as a Youth Care Specialist.47 Under 
Indiana law, the Superior Court has the ability to establish juvenile 
detention and shelter care facilities, and the Superior Court decides 
who it will employ as staff and how to budget.48 Under this statutory 
scheme, Allen County is responsible for paying the expenses of the 
facility.49  
 In 2003, the plaintiff injured his back after being kicked by an 
inmate at the juvenile center.50 He received medical treatment, 
disability benefits, and permanent partial impairment benefits under 
this under Allen County’s workers compensation insurance.51 The 
plaintiff was contacted by an Allen County employee who sent him 
                                                 
 44Id. 
 45 Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 377, 378 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
 46 See Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc., 779 F.3d 697, 702 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 47 890 F.3d at 682.  
 48 Id. at 681.  
 49 Id.  
 50 Id. at 682. 
 51 Id.  
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forms regarding his workers’ compensation benefits.52 The forms 
listed “Allen County Government” as his employer.53 The plaintiff 
informed the county employee that his doctor determined the plaintiff 
had reached “maximum medical improvement” and was given work 
restrictions.54 The county employee told the plaintiff that he would not 
be able to return to his position at the Juvenile Center due to his work 
restrictions. However, she began helping him find another job within 
Allen County.55 The county employee offered the plaintiff a job as a 
part-time judicial assistant; however, the plaintiff rejected the offer 
because the position was without benefits.56 
 The plaintiff was granted an independent medical exam by the 
Indiana Workers’ Compensation Board. The independent doctor 
concluded that the plaintiff had reached maximum medical 
improvement.57 It was after this second exam that the county 
employee reached out to the plaintiff to inform him that his benefits 
were terminated and he would not be able to return to work at the 
Juvenile Center because his work restrictions “prevented him from 
‘perform[ing] the essential functions’ of his position at the Juvenile 
Center, ‘with or without a reasonable accommodation.’”58 The county 
employee claimed to be the ADA Coordinator and offered to help the 
plaintiff find another position within Allen County government.59 The 
county employee also offered to contact the hiring officials of job 
vacancies to assist the plaintiff in getting preference for positions for 
which he qualified.60 The county employee later informed the plaintiff 
that he did not qualify for the positions he applied for.61 Because the 
                                                 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 682-83. 
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county employee could not identify a position that would 
accommodate the plaintiff’s work restrictions, the county employee 
informed the plaintiff that he was considered no longer employed.62  
 The plaintiff brought suit against the Allen County Superior Court 
and the Allen County Board of Commissioners (the Board) for 
discrimination under the ADA.63 The district court found that the 
Board was not the plaintiff’s employer and therefore did not violate 
the ADA.64 The district court analogized the case to another Indiana 
case where probation officers were found to be employees of the court 
due to the statutory scheme in place.65 In O’Reilly, the county was not 
considered the probation officers’ employer because “the main indicia 
of employment, the right to control, [wa]s prescribed by statute solely 
to the court.”66 Based on this analysis, the Board in Harris was granted 
summary judgment.67 
 The plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision, and the 
Seventh Circuit reviewed the decision de novo. The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision.68 The plaintiff argued: (1) the 
county paid his wages and benefits; (2) several documents identified 
the Board as his employer; and (3) the county employee dealt with his 
disability accommodations and his termination.69 The court noted that 
a five-factor test is typically used to determine whether a party is an 
indirect employer, but the court notes that the “factors are simply a 
detailed application of the economic and control considerations 
present in the ‘economic realities’ test.”70 The most important question 
                                                 
 62 Id. at 683.  
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Harris v. Allen Cnty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57369 at 19 
(citing O'Reilly v. Montgomery County, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4585 at *5). 
 66 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57369 at 19 (quoting O'Reilly, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4585 at *3). 
 67 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57369 at 19-20. 
 68 Harris, 890 F.3d at 685. 
 69 Id. at 684. 
 70 Id. at 683 (citing Love, 779 F.3d at 702; Knight, 950 F.2d 377). 
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was whether the supposed employer exercised sufficient control over 
the plaintiff.71 The court turned to two “key control powers:” hiring 
and firing.72 Under Indiana law, the Board did not control the 
plaintiff’s “hiring, firing, day-to-day duties, and salary . . . .”73 All of 
those aspects of the plaintiff’s employment rested with the Allen 
Superior Court, not the Board.74  
 To the plaintiff’s first argument, the Seventh Circuit concluded 
that the Board was statutorily required to pay the Juvenile Center’s 
expenses, and, therefore, even though the Board was not required to 
pay his workers’ compensation benefits, the Board paying those 
benefits to the plaintiff was not enough to show that the Board 
controlled the plaintiff’s employment.75 To the plaintiff’s second 
argument, the court concluded that the documents bearing the Board’s 
seal or identifying the Board as the plaintiff’s employer were not 
sufficient to show control of employment.76 The plaintiff offered 
evidence that the Board conducted performance evaluations, but he 
was unable to show that the Board was responsible for his discipline 
while employed at the Juvenile Center.77 The Seventh Circuit noted 
that the plaintiff’s final argument, that the county employee’s 
involvement exceeded what was statutorily required, was his strongest 
point because the employee was the one to notify the plaintiff that he 
would not be able to return to his former position, she offered him an 
alternative position, she assisted him in finding other employment, and 
she was the one who informed him he was terminated.78 However, the 
plaintiff was unable to show that it was the county employee or the 
                                                 
 71 Harris, 890 F.3d at 683. (citing Knight, 950 F.2d at 378; Love, 779 F.3d at 
705). 
 72 Harris,890 F.3d at 684. (quoting EEOC v. Illinois, 69 F.3d 167, 169 (7th 
Cir. 1995)).  
 73 Harris, 890 F.3d at 685.  
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 685.  
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
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Board that made the decision to terminate the plaintiff.79 The county 
employee indicated to the plaintiff in a letter that she was not in the 
position to hire him, and could only contact the hiring officials on his 
behalf.80 The Seventh Circuit concluded: 
 
It would be unreasonable to infer that [the county employee] 
or the Board had the ability to control these aspects of [the 
plaintiff’s] employment, given that Indiana statutory scheme 
explicitly vests control over [the plaintiff’s] employment in 
the Allen Superior Court and that there is no evidence that 
would allow a trier of fact to find the reality was otherwise.81 
 
WAS THE COURT CORRECT IN ITS DECISION? 
 
 It is evident that the Seventh Circuit has evolved its determination 
of employment status and the associated tests over the last few 
decades. The court began by looking at various circuits to see how 
they were addressing the question of establishing employment 
relationships.82 It discussed the “economic realities” test used by the 
D.C. Circuit in Spirides but agreed with the district court that the 
inquiry was limited to five factors in Knight.83 
 While the Seventh Circuit cited the five-factor test in Harris, it 
did not go through all the factors to conclude that the Allen County 
Board of Commissioners was not the plaintiff’s employer. Yet, in 
Spirides, the Seventh Circuit indicated that “consideration of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the work relationship is essential, and no 
one factor is determinative.”84 Still, the court stated that the 
                                                 
 79 Id. (Emphasis added). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 See Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831; Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 
1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 83 950 F.2d at 378-79. 
 84 613 F.2d 826 at 831 (citing Local 777 v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 866 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978)). 
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employer’s right of control was the most important factor to review.85 
The Seventh Circuit cases that used Spirides place the same emphasis 
on the right of control,86 which may explain why the Seventh Circuit 
in Harris only looked at the factor of control.87 But was the Seventh 
Circuit trying to establish a single-factor test for determining whether 
an employment relationship exists between individuals and 
employers?  
 Regardless of whether the court was attempting to create a new 
test, the Seventh Circuit should have let this case go to a jury. As 
previously mentioned, the Seventh Circuit cited its own precedent 
when discussing what factors are necessary in assessing whether an 
employer has the right to control and direct an individual’s work.88 
The key elements are hiring and firing.89 In the present case, however, 
there was a clear dispute as to who fired the plaintiff.90 The plaintiff 
stated that the county employee made the decision when she initiated 
the conversations regarding his benefits, but he was not able to provide 
proof that she was the one who made the decision. 91 In a footnote, the 
Seventh Circuit briefly mentions that the plaintiff also provided a 
statement that he spoke to a Superior Court employee who had no 
knowledge of his firing and who told the plaintiff that “‘downtown . . . 
handle[d]that.’”92 The court dismissed the statement because it was 
inadmissible,93 but if the factor of control was so important, would it 
not have made a difference if Allen County made the decision to fire 
the plaintiff? This information, at the very least, created a genuine 
                                                 
 85 Id. at 831.  
 86 See Knight, 950 F.2d 377; Love,779 F.3d 697. 
 87 Harris, 890 F.3d at 683.  
 88 Id. at 684.  
 89 Id. (quoting EEOC, 69 F.3d 169). 
 90 The Board insisted that it did not make the decision to terminate the 
plaintiff, but the Superior Court also does not clearly state it made that decision. 
Harris,890 F.3d at 684 n.1. 
 91 Harris, 890 F.3d at 685.  
 92 Id. at 686 n.2.  
 93 Harris, 890 F.3d at 686. Neither the district court nor the Seventh Circuit 
indicate why the statement was inadmissible. 
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dispute of material fact, which would bar granting summary 
judgment.94 Given the emphasis on the factor of control--in particular, 
the aspects of hiring and firing the employee—this fact could have led 
the jury to reach a different conclusion.  
 
ADDRESSING THE INCONSISTENCY IN A BROADER CONTEXT 
 
 The concerns with inconsistency in the standards that help 
establish employment status can be better understood in the context of 
employees versus independent contractors. There are several industries 
in which workers’ classification falls somewhere between an 
employee and an independent contractor. 95 Some of these industries 
include transportation, construction, hospitality, janitorial, personal 
care, and home health care.96 According to the IRS, independent 
contractors generally have the “right to control or direct the result of 
the work[, but] not what will be done and how it will be done.”97 
Additionally, an independent contractor is considered to be “self-
employed” for tax purposes.98 
 The implications for classifying an individual as an employee or 
an independent contractor are quite substantial. For example, 
employers are not “bound to provide workplace protections and 
                                                 
94 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
95 Brishen Rogers, Redefining Employment for the Modern Economy, 10 
Advance 3 (2016), 3. 
96 Brishen Rogers, Redefining Employment for the Modern Economy, 10 
Advance 3 (2016), 3. (citing Sarah Leberstein & Catherine Ruckelshaus, 
Independent Contractor vs. Employee: Why independent contractor misclassification 
matters and what we can do to stop it, 1 (Nat'l Emp. L. Project ed., May 2016), 
https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/Policy-Brief-Independent-Contractor-vs-
Employee.pdf.)). 
97Independent Contractor Defined, Internal Revenue Service, 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-
contractor-defined (last visited Dec. 3, 2018). 
98 Independent Contractor Defined, Internal Revenue Service, 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-
contractor-defined (last visited Dec. 3, 2018). 
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benefits” to independent contractors, only their employees.99 An 
example of this is Uber classifying its drivers as independent 
contractors and not employees. This allows Uber to avoid giving 
drivers health insurance.100  
 When employers classify their workers as independent 
contractors, they also do not have to withhold or pay taxes on the 
payments made to the independent contractors.101 Doing this “[robs] 
unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation funds of billions 
of much-needed dollars, reducing federal, state and local tax 
withholding and revenues, while saving as much as 30% of payroll 
and related taxes otherwise paid for ‘employees.’”102 
 One can see how straddling the lines between these classifications 
can leave an employee extremely vulnerable and without other 
protections discussed in this note. In the example of Uber drivers, a 
recent class action brought against the company by the drivers asks 
that the drivers be recognized as employees under the California Labor 
Code, and not independent contractors.103 Specifically cited in that 
case is the drivers’ wanting Uber to pay the full amount of the tips 
they receive as prescribed by the California’s labor code.104 In cases 
                                                 
99 Sarah Leberstein & Catherine Ruckelshaus, Independent Contractor vs. 
Employee: Why independent contractor misclassification matters and what we can 
do to stop it, 2 (Nat'l Emp. L. Project ed., May 2016), https://www.nelp.org/wp-
content/uploads/Policy-Brief-Independent-Contractor-vs-Employee.pdf. 
100 Stephen Gandel, Uber-nomics: Here's what it would cost Uber to pay its 
drivers as employees, FORTUNE MAG. (Sept. 17, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/09/17/ubernomics. 
101Independent Contractor: Self-Employed or Employee, Internal Revenue 
Service, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/independent-contractor-self-employed-or-employee (Last visited Dec. 3, 
2018). 
102 Sarah Leberstein, “Independent Contractor Misclassification Imposes Huge 
Costs on Workers and Federal and State Treasuries, 1 (National Employment Law 
Project, July 2015), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/Independent-
Contractor-Costs.pdf. 
103 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 
2015). 
104 Id.; Cal. Lab. Code § 351. 
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such as these, however, there are other consequences of being labeled 
as independent contractors. Because the workers are not employees, 
they are consequently not protected under anti-discrimination laws, 
such as the ADA, the ADEA, and Title VII. The drivers also do not 
have the opportunity to organize a union and have representation that 
can negotiate favorable employment terms for the drivers- at least not 
under the NLRA. It is definitely possible that some form of 
organization may be created for these drivers to participate in 
bargaining with the companies, but the drivers and the union would 
not be afforded the same protections under the NLRA and disputes 
would not be addressed by an agency like the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB).105  
 Moreover, it is important to note that data has shown that 10-30 
percent or more of employers misclassify their employees as 
independent contractors.106 Uncertainty in employment status likely 
leads to litigation, and if it is up to courts to decide whether 
individuals should be classified as employees or independent 
contractors, the individuals are at the mercy of the court (and the many 




 It is concerning that courts do not have a concrete standard that 
can applied uniformly to establish an employment relationship 
between an employee and an employer. While it is clear many of the 
cases would depend on the specific circumstances of the case and, 
therefore, it is difficult to create a multi-factor test that would apply to 
each set of facts, there should be some sort of guide that can be used 
by the courts. In the context of employees versus independent 
contractors, California’s ABC test seems to make the most sense. 
                                                 
105 Brishen Rogers, Redefining Employment for the Modern Economy, 10 
Advance 3 (2016), 7. 
106 Sarah Leberstein & Catherine Ruckelshaus, Independent Contractor vs. 
Employee: Why independent contractor misclassification matters and what we can 
do to stop it, 2 (Nat'l Emp. L. Project ed., May 2016), https://www.nelp.org/wp-
content/uploads/Policy-Brief-Independent-Contractor-vs-Employee.pdf. 
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Given the very real concerns about misclassifying individuals as 
independent contractors rather an employees107 (due to ignorance or 
self-serving intentions), classifying individuals as employees unless 
the employer can satisfy a certain standard108 seems to be the best way 
to protect both employees and employers like. This author is not 
prepared to say what kind of factors should go into this standard, as 
the discussion in this note suggests that all the circumstances 
surrounding the potential employment relationship are essential and 
should be considered.109 However, in light of the numerous tests to 
establish an employment relationship between an individual and an 
employer and the lack of guidance in the labor and employment 
statutes, it seems to be a step in the right direction. 
 
                                                 
 107 See supra part IV. 
 108 See case cited supra note 30. 
 109 See case cited supra note 29 and 85. 
20
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 9
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol14/iss1/9
